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LABOR LAw-LMRA-DEDUCTION oF WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION FROM 
EMPLOYER'S BACK PAY LIABILITY-The National Labor Relations Board 
found that the Moss Planing Mill Company had committed an unfair 
labor practice in discharging an employee for his union activities.1 The 
company's secretary-treasurer also had battered the employee, inflicting 
injury, at the time of the discharge. Pursuant to section IO (c) of the 
amended National Labor Relations Act,2 the Board ordered the company 
to reinstate the employee and make him whole for back pay lost due to 
the unfair discharge. The order was enforced by the court of appeals.3 
In a supplemental order specifying the amount of back pay to be awarded;' 
the Board refused to deduct the sum of $432 which the employee had 
received for incapacity from the injury under North Carolina's workmen's 
compensation law.5 On a motion to amend the enforcement decree, held, 
the Board's supplemental order set aside and remanded for new computa-
tion with deduction of the $432. Workmen's compensation benefits paid 
by the employer's insurance carrier are in discharge of the employer's 
statutory obligation to compensate the employee for injuries arising out of 
employment and, as such, are direct benefits to be deducted from the em-
ployer's gross back pay liability. Failure to deduct them would make the 
employee more than whole at the expense of the employer. NLRB v. Moss 
Planing Mill Co., (4th Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 702. 
Section IO (c) of the Taft-Hartley Act authorizes the Board, upon find-
ing an unfair labor practice, to -order "such affirmative action, including 
reinstatement with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of 
this Act .... "6 This provision was intended to vest no private right in the 
employee.7 The Supreme Court has said that a back pay order is designed 
to vindicate the public policy against unfair labor practices and operates 
as a command to pay the amount owed to the Board as agent for the em-
ployee. 8 The Court has held that liability for back pay may not exceed 
compensation for the employee's loss from the unfair discharge, the Board's 
power to order affirmative action being purely "remedial" and not "puni-
1103 N.L.R.B. 414 (1953). 
2 61 Stat. L. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §160 (c). 
a (4th Cir. 1953) 206 F. (2d) 557. 
4 110 N.L.R.B. 933 (1954) (one member dissenting). 
Ii N.C. Gen. Stat. (1950) §§97-1 to 97-122. 
6 61 Stat. L. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §160 (c). 
7 See H. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 24 (1935). 
8 Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 73 S.Ct. 80 (1952). 
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tive."9 It has been established that the Board must deduct from a back 
pay award any amount actually earned elsewhere by the employee during 
the interim between unfair discharge and reinstatement, and also any 
amount which he might reasonably have earned in mitigation but inex-
cusably failed to earn.10 In NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co.,U state unemploy-
ment insurance benefits were held not to be earnings in mitigation of the 
loss so that it was no abuse of the Board's discretion for it to refuse to 
deduct such payments from back pay awards. The Court reasoned that 
(1) since no consideration is given to collateral losses in computing awards, 
no consideration should be given to collateral benefits and (2) unemploy-
ment insurance benefits are collateral because they are not made in dis-
charge of any obligation of the employer, but, rather, are designed to 
effectuate a policy of social betterment for the entire state.12 In the 
principal case, the court distinguished workmen's compensation benefits 
from "collateral benefits" on the basis that the former are paid directly 
by the employer or his insurance carrier to make partial compensation13 
for earning capacity lost through industrial injury.14 Thus, the court 
views such benefits as essentially back pay, and compels the Board to 
deduct them. To the possible objection that this allows the employer 
two wrongs (discriminatory discharge and infliction of injury) for the 
price of one, it may be replied that workmen's compensation is intended 
to provide benefits from the employer in place of wages lost through injury, 
without regard to the fault or negligence of the employer. Nothing puni-
tive is involved.15 Workmen's compensation guarantees the employee 
positive benefits in lieu of wages lost due to industrial injury, while pre-
cluding additional recovery from the employer based on fault.16 It would 
seem to be a clear abuse of the Board's remedial discretion to order the 
employer to pay full back wages plus a workmen's compensation award 
9 Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206 (1938); Republic 
Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77 (1940). 
10 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 61 S.Ct. 845 (1941); 133 A.L.R. 1217 
(1941). This is, of course, an extension of the contract law principle of mitigation of 
damages. See 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs, rev. ed., §1358 (1937). Failure to take reasonable 
steps in mitigation of damages was a separate ground of setting aside the Board's com-
putations in the principal case. 
11340 U.S. 361, 71 S.Ct. 337 (1951). 
12 Groceries donated to an employee by a union are collateral benefits and need not 
be deducted. NLRB v. Brashear Freight Lines Inc., (8th Cir. 1942) 127 F. (2d) 198. 
13 The North Carolina statute provides benefits of 60% of the incapacitated worker's 
average weekly wage. N.C. Gen. Stat. (1950) §97-29. 
14 North Carolina, like many other states, allows the employer to be self-insurer by 
proving ability to pay. N.C. Gen. Stat. (1950) §97-93. The insurance pool system may 
tend to shift the burden of compensation onto the ultimate consuming public, but does 
not negate an individual employer's liability for specific claims. See Larson, "The Na-
ture and Origins of Workmen's Compensation," 37 CoRN. L. Q. 206 at 215 (1952). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Payment of a workmen's compensation award by an employer bars further recovery 
by the employee against the employer for the same injury, but a tort action against the 
individual inflicting the injury may be maintained. H. J. McCune v. Rhodes-Rhyne Mfg. 
Co., 217 N.C. 351, 8 S.E. (2d) 219 (1940). 
1016 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
for the same period in the case where the employee's injury results from no 
fault of the employer. To reach a different result when the employer 
has been guilty of tortious conduct would be to invoke a punitive power 
which the Supreme Court has denied the Board.17 Once the employer is 
made liable for full back wages, the Board is without discretion to add 
punitive damages.18 It may be that the courts have gone too far in limiting 
the discretion of the Board in its administration of the reinstatement-with-
back-pay provision.19 The ·act contains no express requirement of mitiga-
tion of damages, let alone deduction of compensation benefits. Neverthe-
less, such a deduction appears to be required under the current judicial 
view that the Board's power is purely remedial in nature. 
John A. Beach 
17 In the principal case the Board refused to follow its usual practice of excluding 
from back pay coverage any time during which the employee was incapable of working 
on the ground that the employer caused the incapacity. Note I supra, at 419. 
18 Retention by the employee of full back wages plus unemployment insurance for 
the same period was justified in NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., note 11 supra, on the ground 
that the two payments were from different sources. In the principal case the employer 
was liable for both Board and workmen's compensation awards. See also Matter of 
Skutnik, 268 App. Div. 357, 51 N.Y.S. (2d) 711 (1944), where state unemployment benefits 
were ordered refunded upon recovery of a back pay award. 
19 See Farber, "Reversion to Individualism: The Back Pay Doctrines. of the NL.R.B.," 
7 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 262 (1954). . 
